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How should a Chief Justice be assessed?  This conference provides 
the occasion for considering this question as part of looking at the 
role of Chief Justice on the Supreme Court and in the American legal 
system.  Rather than examining the office generally, I want to focus on 
assessing William Rehnquist as Chief Justice.   One way of assessing any 
Chief Justice is in terms of her ability to achieve a substantive vision of 
the law.  In this sense, few would disagree that John Marshall and Earl 
Warren were enormously successful in having their substantive visions 
reflected in the decisions of their Courts.  Marshall’s visions of judicial 
review and federalism, among other crucial issues, were embodied in 
decisions like Marbury v. Madison1 and McCulloch v. Maryland,2 which 
provided a framework for government that lasts to this day.  Earl War-
ren’s visions of a more equal society better protecting the dignity of 
individuals were reflected in the desegregation cases,3 the rulings in-
corporating the Bill of Rights,4 and the decisions requiring reappor-
tionment of state legislatures.5  Writings on the Warren Court, both by 
 † Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University. 
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (providing that the Supreme Court can re-
view and invalidate laws that are unconstitutional). 
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436-37 (1819) (establishing that states cannot tax an “in-
strument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execu-
tion”). 
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that segregat-
ing students based on race deprived children of educational opportunities and was 
therefore illegal). 
4 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (incorporating the 
Sixth Amendment trial-by-jury right to apply in all criminal cases, including those at 
the state level); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (concluding that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right that applies to states); Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule applies to state searches as well as federal searches). 
5 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (articulating the requirement 
for “one person, one vote” in drawing election districts). 
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historians and other Justices, leave no doubt as to the profound effect 
of Earl Warren in bringing about these results.6
How should William Rehnquist be assessed as Chief Justice?  More 
specifically, to what extent did the decisions of the Rehnquist Court 
reflect the views of its Chief Justice?  That is the focus of this Article. 
At the outset, I need to admit to all of the problems in even en-
gaging in this inquiry.  First, it is problematic to assess history that is so 
recent.  The last Term of the Rehnquist Court ended on June 27, 
2005, and an academic conference in November 2005 provides only 
the chance for immediate reflections on an era that has just ended.  
Certainly, one measure of effectiveness is in bringing about enduring 
changes in the law.  At this point, there can be nothing except guesses 
and speculation as to which aspects of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions 
will survive and provide a framework for future rulings and which will 
be overruled or relegated to constitutional footnotes.7
Second, focusing on the Court’s decisions does not assess all of 
the other ways in which a Chief Justice influences the Court and the 
judicial system.  For example, a key role of the Chief is in the opera-
tion of the Supreme Court, including its efficiency and its collegiality.  
From everything that is known so far, William Rehnquist likely will be 
regarded as an excellent Chief in these tasks.8  One of the most im-
portant developments during the time Rehnquist was Chief Justice was 
a dramatic decrease in the size of the Supreme Court’s docket.  The 
Court handed down 164 written opinions in Rehnquist’s first year as 
6 See WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 114-15 (1980) (discussing Warren’s influence on the Court 
in deciding Brown); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 682-86 (1977) 
(providing a historical account of how Warren helped to unite the Supreme Court in 
Brown). 
7 There already are several excellent books on the Rehnquist Court and the im-
pact of its decisions.  See, e.g., MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER:  THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 1 (2002) (noting that the Rehnquist 
court has radically changed American law); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:  THE 
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-10 (2005) (listing the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s decisions on different social and political issues); 
Martin H. Belsky, The Rehnquist Court:  A Review at the End of the Millennium, in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT:  A RETROSPECTIVE 3 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) (“Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has been able to witness and even shape a dramatic change in constitutional 
jurisprudence . . . .”). 
8 His predecessor, Warren Burger, has been much criticized in these regards.  See, 
e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 174 (1979) (discussing Burger’s problems in administering the Supreme Court 
and noting that he spread himself too thin with non-Court business). 
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an Associate Justice,9 but only seventy-nine opinions in his last Term.10  
I doubt that anyone would deny that this reflects Rehnquist’s influ-
ence.11
The Chief Justice also is responsible for overseeing the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the important rules committees, and 
other aspects of the federal judiciary, including making appointments 
to some specialized courts and committees.  Although all of this is im-
portant, none of it is my focus.   
Third, it must be recognized that the success, or lack of it, in im-
plementing a substantive vision may have nothing to do with the Chief 
Justice’s effectiveness.  Imagine that Michael Dukakis had won the 
1988 presidential election and had appointed the successors to Wil-
liam Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.  Without Clarence Thomas as 
a fifth vote in so many cases, countless decisions implementing 
Rehnquist’s views almost surely would have come out differently.12  
Rehnquist likely would have been far less successful substantively, but 
not because of anything to do with his skills or effectiveness. 
Fourth, the quantity of cases makes overall assessments inherently 
questionable.  Rehnquist served as Chief Justice from 1986 to 2005.  
Over those nineteen Terms, the Supreme Court decided thousands of 
cases.  It is possible to find examples to support any conclusion.  Care 
must be taken to avoid “law-office history”—picking cases from the 
historical record to support preconceived conclusions.13
9 The Supreme Court, 1972 Term:  The Statistics, 87 HARV. L. REV. 303, 303 tbl.1a 
(1973). 
10 The Supreme Court, 2004 Term:  The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 420 tbl.1a 
(2005). 
11 Whether this reduction is desirable, of course, is a different question and one 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
12 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (resolving the 2000 
presidential election by reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida); Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (upholding the ability of the Boy 
Scouts to exclude homosexuals on freedom of association grounds); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (limiting Congress’s power to authorize suits against 
state governments); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (declaring un-
constitutional a federal statute for exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority). 
13 See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court:  An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119, 122 n.13 (speaking of “law-office history” and its dangers when examining a his-
torical record). 
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Although I admit to all of these problems,14 I still believe it is 
worth offering an initial assessment of William Rehnquist’s substantive 
success as Chief Justice.  My overall conclusion is that Rehnquist was 
enormously successful in that the Supreme Court during his tenure 
accepted his views in almost every area of law.  In some high profile 
areas, the Court did not go as far as Rehnquist wanted.  The Court did 
not overrule abortion rights, but it did abandon the use of strict scru-
tiny and provided more deference to government regulation of abor-
tions.15  The Court did not eliminate all affirmative action,16 but it did 
adopt strict scrutiny as the test for racial classifications benefiting mi-
norities.17  The Rehnquist Court did not overrule the test for the Es-
tablishment Clause put forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,18 but it did allow 
much more government aid to parochial schools.19
In explaining my assessment of the Rehnquist Court, this Article is 
divided into two parts.  Part I argues that it is a mistake to think of the 
Rehnquist Court as if it were the same throughout the tenure of the 
Chief Justice.  Rather, I believe that there were three distinct phases of 
the Rehnquist Court and that Rehnquist’s success in achieving his 
substantive vision varied over time.  Part II then looks at the specific 
areas of constitutional law and suggests that in every major area, 
14 Yet another problem is in determining the vision of the Chief Justice.  Although 
a Chief Justice’s views can be determined from her opinions, there is no way to know 
the priorities that a Chief Justice placed on the various areas of law. 
15 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (allow-
ing legislation mandating waiting periods for abortions that previously had been in-
validated in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983)). 
16 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (allowing colleges and univer-
sities to use race as one factor in admissions decisions to benefit minorities and en-
hance diversity). 
17 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding 
that any racial classifications by federal or local actors must be given strict scrutiny); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (upholding strict 
scrutiny for racial classifications even when the classifications benefit minorities). 
18 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that a statute “must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose,” that its “primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion” and that it does not “foster an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (approving an 
Ohio program that provides assistance to children in “failed school district[s]” to at-
tend any other school in the area, including religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (“[N]othing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion 
of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs . . . .”); 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to go to 
“parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children”). 
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Rehnquist was very successful in that the Court adopted and reflected 
his views and visions. 
This Article is meant to be descriptive, not normative.  My goal is 
to describe the Rehnquist Court and assess the extent to which its de-
cisions reflected the substantive values of its Chief Justice.  Although 
my descriptions are undoubtedly influenced by my quite different 
normative vision, I do not seek to evaluate or criticize the desirability 
of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions and doctrines.  Quite the contrary, 
my hope is that both liberals and conservatives will agree with the de-
scriptions I provide below of the Rehnquist Court and my assessment 
of the substantive success of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. 
I.  THE ERAS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 
It is tempting to speak of the Rehnquist Court as if it were a single 
entity and the same throughout the tenure of William Rehnquist as 
Chief Justice.  In an obvious way, this is incorrect because the Court’s 
membership changed over Rehnquist’s nineteen years as Chief Jus-
tice.  In 1987, Lewis Powell was replaced by Anthony Kennedy.  In 
1990, William Brennan was replaced by David Souter.  In 1991, Thur-
good Marshall was replaced by Clarence Thomas.  In 1993, Byron 
White was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  In 1994, Harry Black-
mun was replaced by Stephen Breyer.  In other words, five of the 
other eight Justices were replaced during Rehnquist’s time as Chief 
Justice.  Or put another way, only three Justices—John Paul Stevens, 
Sandra Day O’Connor, and Antonin Scalia—were present for all of 
the Rehnquist Court.  Interestingly, all of the changes in personnel 
occurred in the first eight years of the Rehnquist Court; there were no 
vacancies during the last eleven years. 
Professor Thomas W. Merrill suggested that there were two 
Rehnquist Courts:  one from October 1986 until July 1994, and one 
after that time period.20  Professor Merrill suggested, among other 
conclusions, that in its second phase, the Rehnquist Court was “in-
creasingly dominated by a single bloc of five Justices” and that 
“[s]ocial issues like abortion, affirmative action, and school prayer 
have significantly receded from the scene.”21  Although I think that 
Professor Merrill’s analysis can be criticized for giving too little atten-
20 Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:  A Preliminary Analy-
sis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 569-70 (2003). 
21 Id. at 570. 
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tion to cases that were inconsistent with his thesis,22 developments 
since his article undermine his view that there were just two eras of 
the Rehnquist Court.  Between 2002, the last Term that Professor 
Merrill considered, and the end of June 2005, the Court very much 
turned to the social agenda which Professor Merrill saw the Court as 
eschewing.  Subsequent to Professor Merrill’s article, the Court up-
held affirmative action in colleges and universities,23 invalidated laws 
criminalizing private consensual homosexual activity,24 struck down a 
federal law regulating child pornography,25 and found a Ten Com-
mandments display on government property to be unconstitutional.26  
By any measure, including Professor Merrill’s own definition, these 
are “social issues,” and they by no means retreated from the scene 
during the last years of the Rehnquist Court. 
Moreover, the five-Justice bloc that Professor Merrill identified was 
much less cohesive during the last years of the Rehnquist Court.  For 
example, of the seventy-six decisions in October Term 2004, nineteen 
were decided by a five-to-four margin, and in only four of these closely 
divided decisions was the majority comprised of Rehnquist, 
O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Thus, while I agree very 
much with Professor Merrill’s premise that the Rehnquist Court 
changed over time, I see the phases of the Rehnquist Court quite dif-
ferently from Professor Merrill’s description.  I believe that there were 
three distinct phases of the Rehnquist Court since William Rehnquist 
22 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court:  An Admiring Reply to 
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 670-74 (2003) (arguing that the second 
Rehnquist Court addressed the same number of cases, or more, involving social issues 
as compared to the first Rehnquist Court). 
23 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“The Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions 
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that 
flow from a diverse student body.”). 
24 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that a Texas statute 
criminalizing private, consensual homosexual conduct is not furthered by a legitimate 
state interest). 
25 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 257-58 (2002) (holding that the 
prohibitions against material appearing to be child pornography or promoted as child 
pornography are overbroad and unconstitutional). 
26 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2738-41 (2005) (finding 
that the posting of the Ten Commandments in government buildings for the purpose 
of advancing religion violates the Establishment Clause).  But on the same day the 
Court upheld another Ten Commandments display.  See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854, 2858-59 (2005) (holding that a six-foot-high, three-foot-wide Ten Command-
ments monument between the Texas State Capitol and the Texas Supreme Court does 
not violate the Establishment Clause). 
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was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986.  The first phase, from 1986 to 
about 1992, was characterized by great deference to the elected 
branches of government.  Rarely during this time did the Court in-
validate federal, state, or local laws,27 and the Court frequently pro-
claimed the need for great judicial deference to the elected branches 
of government.28
To select one Term as an example, October Term 1988 was 
marked by an exceptional number of significant rulings, such as nar-
rowing abortion rights,29 limiting affirmative action,30 striking down 
laws prohibiting flag burning,31 and curtailing the availability of ha-
beas corpus.32  It also was an important Term in that it was the first full 
year on the Court for Anthony Kennedy, who often joined with 
Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, and Scalia, providing the fifth vote for 
conservative five-to-four decisions.  In describing that Term soon after 
its completion, I wrote: 
 The Court’s desire to avoid judicial value impositions combined with 
its commitment to deferring to majoritarian decisionmaking produces a 
sweeping judicial deference.  The Court’s inability to develop a theory of 
interpretation consistent with its premises—a theory for when it should 
accept constitutional claims and hold against the government—leaves 
the Court in a very deferential posture. 
 Thus, one obvious consequence of the Court’s jurisprudence is that 
the government generally wins constitutional cases.33
Statistics from October Term 1988 supported this conclusion of a 
highly deferential Court, and especially that the conservative Justices 
were particularly loathe to strike down actions taken by the elected 
branches of government. 
27 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword:  The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
43, 56-59 (1989) (describing judicial deference during October Term 1988). 
28 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (upholding a state 
law that denied unmarried fathers all parental rights based on deference to a legisla-
tive policy of maintaining the integrity of the marital union). 
29 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518, 532 (1989) (upholding 
Missouri’s regulation of abortions with four Justices strongly indicating a desire to 
overrule Roe v. Wade). 
30 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (invalidat-
ing a city’s set-aside of thirty percent of its public works’ money for contracts with mi-
nority-owned businesses). 
31 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (invalidating a state law prohibit-
ing flag burning). 
32 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that a habeas petition 
may rely on a new rule of constitutional law only if it is applied retroactively). 
33 Chemerinsky, supra note 27, at 56-57. 
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For example, in forty-seven non-unanimous decisions in constitutional 
cases during the 1988[] Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted against the 
government only twice.  Similarly, in non-unanimous cases, Justice Ken-
nedy voted against the government only five times.  The government 
prevailed in seventy-nine percent of the non-unanimous decisions in 
constitutional cases before the Supreme Court [that] Term.
34
If all constitutional decisions, both unanimous and nonunani-
mous, are examined, “the government won sixty-six percent of the 
constitutional cases [in the 1988] Term.”35  By contrast, twenty years 
earlier, in the 1968 Term—the last year of the Warren Court—“the 
government prevailed in only twenty-three percent of the constitu-
tional decisions.”36
Nor was this judicial deference a one-year phenomenon.  A year 
later, for example, the Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith, 
tremendously limited the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and provided for great judicial deference to gov-
ernment actions burdening religion.37  The second phase of the 
Rehnquist Court was from 1992 through about 2002.38  This era was 
marked by a dramatic lack of deference to Congress and the states.  
Former Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman observed that 
[d]uring the entire first 200 years following ratification of the Constitu-
tion, only 127 federal laws were struck down—even accounting for the 
many laws that fell victim to the New Deal’s head-on collision with the 
Supreme Court in the tumultuous 1930s. 
 These days, however, the extraordinary act of one branch of govern-
ment declaring that the other two branches have violated the Constitu-
tion has become almost commonplace.  Since 1995, the Court has in-
validated twenty-six different federal enactments . . . .
39
34 Id. at 57-58 (internal citation omitted). 
35 Id. at 58. 
36 Id. 
37 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated 
by neutral laws of general applicability); see also infra notes 113-14 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Court’s unprecedented restriction of the Free Exercise Clause in 
Smith). 
38 In this way, I am disagreeing with Professor Merrill, who puts the second phase 
of the Court as beginning in 1994, characterized by an emphasis on federalism and a 
deemphasis on social issues.  Merrill, supra note 20, at 570.  I choose 1992 because that 
was the first year in which the Rehnquist Court, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 149, 161-66 (1992), invalidated a federal law on federalism grounds. 
39 Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2001) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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The Court’s lack of deference to Congress was most evident in the 
federalism decisions, where the Court invalidated laws as exceeding 
the scope of the Commerce Clause,40 narrowed the scope of Con-
gress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,41 re-
vived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal power,42 and 
expanded the scope of sovereign immunity to limit the enforcement 
of federal statutes.43
Nor was the Rehnquist Court during this time one that deferred 
to state legislatures; as Professor Merrill has noted, the Court fre-
quently found state laws preempted by federal law during this time.44  
One would imagine that a Court committed to states’ rights would 
narrow the preemptive scope of federal law,45 but this was not the case 
40 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (invalidating the 
civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as exceeding the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 on the grounds that it 
“neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession 
[of a firearm in a manner prohibited by the Act] be connected in any way to interstate 
commerce”). 
41 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
42 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating a provi-
sion of federal law requiring that state and local law enforcement perform background 
checks before issuing permits for firearms); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 149, 
161-66 (invalidating a key provision of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985 as impermissibly commandeering the states and violating the 
Tenth Amendment). 
43 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment protects state governments from suit for alleged violations of Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 67 (2000) (holding that state governments could not be sued for violating the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967). 
44 Merrill, supra note 20, at 571 (commenting upon “the continued willingness of 
the Court to find state laws preempted by federal regulation”); see also Erwin Chemer-
insky, Empowering States When It Matters:  A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1313, 1314 (2004) (describing Rehnquist Court decisions finding preemption). 
45 As Professor Merrill observes, 
A true believer in states’ rights presumably would want to see greater power 
devolve from the federal government to the states.  Such a sincere federalist 
would not only support formal limits on congressional power and immunities 
for states from suits by private citizens grounded in federal law, but he or she 
would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of federal statutes narrowly, 
so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory authority as possible. 
Merrill, supra note 20, at 611; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 1313 (“One would 
expect that a Court concerned with federalism and states’ rights also would be narrow-
ing the scope of federal preemption of state laws.”). 
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for the Rehnquist Court.46  Also, the Court invalidated many state laws 
as violating the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech 
and association.47  Indeed, in cases striking down restrictions on 
speech by judicial candidates and ruling in favor of the Boy Scouts’ 
ability to exclude gays despite a state law prohibiting such discrimina-
tion, the Court was split five to four with the five most conservative 
Justices ruling against the state law.  Nor after Bush v. Gore48 can it be 
credibly claimed that the five most conservative Justices always showed 
deference to state courts. 
But in the last few years of its existence, the Rehnquist Court was 
decidedly more moderate.  There was a third distinct phase of the 
Rehnquist Court, from 2002 through June 2005.  In 2003, for exam-
ple, the Court upheld a law school’s affirmative action plan49 and in-
validated a state law prohibiting private consensual homosexual activ-
ity.50  Every federalism case in the last few years of the Rehnquist 
Court was resolved in favor of federal power and against states’ 
rights.51  The last year of the Rehnquist Court—October Term 2004—
continued this pattern.  Many of the most significant cases were re-
46 See Merrill, supra note 20, at 611-12 (noting the paradoxical support for pre-
emption by Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas). 
47 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (invalidat-
ing a state law prohibiting judicial candidates from expressing views about disputed 
legal or political issues as a violation of the First Amendment); Boy Scouts of America 
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (invalidating the application of a state public ac-
commodation law compelling the Boy Scouts to accept a homosexual as a scout leader 
on the grounds that the law violated First Amendment association rights). 
48 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s demand of a 
statewide recount of voter ballots would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
49 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“[T]he Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions 
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that 
flow from a diverse student body.”).  But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249-51 
(2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate affirmative action 
program as violating the Equal Protection Clause). 
50 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no 
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life 
of the individual.”). 
51 See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004) (upholding federal leg-
islation “proscribing bribery of state, local, and tribal officials of entities that receive at 
least $10,000 in federal funds, [as] a valid exercise of congressional authority under 
Article I of the Constitution”); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (up-
holding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 as a constitutional use of 
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dep’t of Hu-
man Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003) (permitting a private right of action for 
Nevada state employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
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solved in a way that progressives, not conservatives, would prefer.  For 
example, the Court invalidated the death penalty for crimes commit-
ted by juveniles,52 refused to provide more protection for property 
owners,53 and expanded the protections of federal civil rights stat-
utes.54
I do not want to overstate the significance of this phenomenon or 
to portray the Rehnquist Court as being overly liberal in its last few 
years.  There certainly have been many instances, especially in the 
area of criminal justice, where the Rehnquist Court has ruled as one 
would predict a conservative Court to act.  In 2003, the Court upheld 
life sentences for shoplifters under California’s three strikes law.55  In 
October Terms 2003 and 2004 there were ten Fourth Amendment 
cases, of which nine were decided in favor of law enforcement and 
against criminal defendants.56
52 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (barring the death penalty 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for those under eighteen years of age 
at the time of the commission of their crimes). 
53 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2666 (2005) (holding that a 
private corporation’s use of the government’s eminent domain power can fulfill “pub-
lic use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 
U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005) (holding that a government regulation need not be shown to 
“substantially advance legitimate state interests” in order to avoid being a taking). 
54 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (allowing disparate impact 
employment discrimination claims to be brought under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 
(2005) (holding that claims of retaliation for sex discrimination complaints are action-
able under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972). 
55 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (“[I]t was not an unreasonable 
application of our clearly established law for [a state court] to affirm [the defendant’s] 
sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.”); Ewing v. California, 
538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (holding that defendant’s “sentence of 25 years to life in person 
. . . is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment[]”). 
56 See, e.g., Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95-96 (2005) (holding that the police 
may detain and question a person who is not suspected of any crime, but happens to 
be in the house of someone else that is being searched, and holding that additional 
questioning beyond the scope of the search does not violate the Fourth Amendment); 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005) (holding that the Fourth Amendment 
does not require “reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection 
dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop”); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 
146, 152-56 (2004) (holding that a warrantless arrest is valid so long as there was prob-
able cause at the time of the arrest, regardless of whether the offense was “closely re-
lated” to the offense the arresting officer identified as the reason for arrest).  The only 
exception in the last two years was Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 551 (2004), which 
held that a warrant must specify with particularity that which is to be searched or 
seized. 
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Overall, then, in assessing the Rehnquist Court, Professor Merrill 
is correct in separating its differing phases.  I, however, disagree with 
his description.  In assessing the substantive success of William 
Rehnquist as a Chief Justice, an obvious conclusion emerges:  
Rehnquist was far more successful in the first two phases, from 1986 to 
2002, than in the last phase.  Both in his Court’s initial deferential 
phase and in its subsequent more activist phase, Rehnquist was consis-
tently in the majority in all of the areas described above.  In fact, in 
every single case cited above from 1986 to 2002, Rehnquist was in the 
majority and wrote most of the majority opinions.  But from 2002 to 
2005, Rehnquist was hardly in the majority at all in any of the deci-
sions coming to the more progressive results mentioned above.57
Of course, it is tempting to speculate as to why the shift in the 
Rehnquist Court occurred, especially as to the change in its last few 
years.  After giving this great reflection, I do not have a persuasive an-
swer.  Ultimately, the answer may be a straightforward one:  in the last 
few years of the Rehnquist Court, the more moderate group of Jus-
tices (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) were more successful in 
many key cases at getting either O’Connor or Kennedy than the most 
conservative Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) were at getting 
both.  This is an accurate account of the decisions, but it still does not 
explain why O’Connor and Kennedy were more likely to vote with the 
moderate group in the last few years than they were to do so prior to 
then. 
II.  THE THEMES OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 
The prior section offered one way of looking at assessing the suc-
cess of Chief Justice Rehnquist:  temporally, by focusing on specific 
time periods.  Another way of examining and assessing Rehnquist’s 
tenure as Chief Justice is more thematic, looking at the specific doc-
trinal themes of the Rehnquist Court and considering the extent to 
which each reflects Rehnquist’s views. 
Although any examination is inherently incomplete, I identify six 
major themes of the Rehnquist Court and suggest that all very much 
reflect the views of its Chief Justice: 
(1)  No new suspect classifications were found, and remedies for consti-
57 The only exception where Rehnquist was in the majority for what would be re-
garded as a progressive result was Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 725 (2003), which permitted a private right of action to Nevada state em-
ployees under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. 
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tutional violations were limited. 
(2)  No new fundamental rights were recognized during the Rehnquist 
Court, and many already existing rights were narrowed. 
(3)  The protections accorded criminal defendants were significantly 
narrowed. 
(4)  The limits imposed on the government by the Establishment Clause 
were relaxed. 
(5)  Access to federal courts to hear civil rights claims was significantly 
limited. 
(6)  The powers of Congress were restricted for the first time in almost 
sixty years:  new limits were imposed on Congress’s commerce power 
and authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Tenth 
Amendment was revived as a constraint on federal power, and state sov-
ereign immunity was significantly expanded. 
I list these together at the outset because this is a place where the 
whole is more than the sum of the parts; taken together, these themes 
show a Court that, overall, moved the law significantly to the right.58  
Taken together, the themes show a Court that, overall, reflected the 
ideology and positions of its Chief Justice. 
To explain, I will consider each of these six themes individually. 
A.  No New Suspect Classifications Were Found, and Remedies for 
Constitutional Violations Were Limited 
At the inception of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, it was clearly es-
tablished that strict scrutiny was used for discrimination based on race 
and national origin,59 and also generally for discrimination against 
58 This obviously does not reflect all of the areas of constitutional law.  One obvi-
ous omission is freedom of speech under the First Amendment.  Here, the record is 
much more mixed as to whether the Rehnquist Court followed the views of the Chief 
Justice.  For example, although Rehnquist was a consistent advocate for empowering 
the government to regulate sexual speech, sometimes he was in the majority in this 
effort, but sometimes in dissent.  Compare City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283 
(2000) (upholding regulations of sexual speech with Rehnquist in the majority), Alex-
ander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 546-47 (1993) (same), and Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991) (same), with Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 
(2004) (limiting federal laws regulating sexual speech on First Amendment grounds 
with Rehnquist dissenting), and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 
(2002) (same). 
59 Ironically, the first case to label discrimination based on race or national origin 
as “suspect” was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944) (upholding the 
evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast during World War II). 
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noncitizens.60  Intermediate scrutiny was used under equal protection 
for gender discrimination61 and for discrimination against non-marital 
children.62  All other types of discrimination received only rational ba-
sis review under equal protection. 
This did not change at all in the nineteen years of the Rehnquist 
Court.  In fact, the only major case finding an equal protection viola-
tion outside of these areas—Romer v. Evans—expressly used rational 
basis review in declaring unconstitutional discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.63
The most important victory by a plaintiff asserting an equal pro-
tection violation was Bush v. Gore,64 in which Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was in the majority. 
The Rehnquist Court consistently limited remedies for violations 
of civil rights.  This was evident in the area of school desegregation.  
In Board of Education v. Dowell, the issue was whether a desegregation 
order should continue when its end would mean a resegregation of 
the public schools.65  Oklahoma schools had been segregated under a 
state law mandating separation of the races.66  A federal court order 
was successful in desegregating the Oklahoma City public schools.67  
Evidence proved that ending the desegregation order would result in 
resegregation.68  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that once a 
“unitary” school system had been achieved, a federal court’s desegre-
60 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (using strict scrutiny to 
invalidate a state law denying welfare benefits to noncitizens).  But in some instances, 
only rational basis review is used for discrimination against non-citizens, such as where 
the alienage classification relates to self-government and the democratic process.  See, 
e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296-300 (1978) (upholding a statute preventing 
noncitizens from being police officers as meeting rational basis review). 
61 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating intermediate 
scrutiny as the test for gender discrimination). 
62 See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978) (applying intermediate scru-
tiny as the test for determining the rights of illegitimate children whose fathers died 
intestate); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (same). 
63 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating a state initiative that repealed all laws 
protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination and precluded the enactment of new 
antidiscrimination laws). 
64 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) (finding that Florida’s recount proce-
dures in the 2000 presidential election violated the fundamental right to vote). 
65 498 U.S. 237, 248-50 (1991). 
66 Id. at 240. 
67 Id. at 241-42. 
68 Id. at 242. 
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gation order should end even if it would mean resegregation of the 
schools.69
The Court did not define “unitary system” with any specificity.  It 
simply said that the desegregation decree should be ended if the 
board “ha[s] complied in good faith” and “the vestiges of past dis-
crimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.”70  The 
Court said that in evaluating this, “the District Court should look not 
only at student assignments, but to every facet of school operations—
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.”71
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that a federal court 
desegregation order should end when it is complied with, even if 
other desegregation orders for the same school system remain in 
place.72  A federal district court ordered desegregation of various as-
pects of a school system in Georgia that previously had been segre-
gated by law.73  Part of the desegregation plan had been met; the 
school system had achieved desegregation in pupil assignment and in 
facilities.74  Another aspect of the desegregation order, concerning as-
signment of teachers, had not yet been fulfilled.75  The Court said that 
once a portion of a desegregation order is met, the federal court 
should cease its efforts as to that part and remain involved only as to 
those aspects of the plan that have not been achieved.76
In 1995, in Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), the Court ordered an 
end to a school desegregation order for Kansas City schools.77  Mis-
souri law once required the racial segregation of all public schools.78  
It was not until 1985 that a federal district court ordered the desegre-
gation of the Kansas City, Missouri, public schools.79  The federal 
court’s desegregation effort made a difference.  In 1983, twenty-four 
69 Id. at 248-50. 
70 Id. at 249-50. 
71 Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 474. 
75 Id. at 481. 
76 Id. at 491. 
77 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995).  Earlier in the life of the case, the Supreme Court had 
ruled that a federal district court could order a local taxing body to increase taxes to 
pay for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should not 
itself order an increase in the taxes.  Missouri v. Jenkins ( Jenkins I), 495 U.S. 33, 57-58 
(1990). 
78 Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 37. 
79 Id. at 37-38. 
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schools in the district had an African American enrollment of 90% or 
more.80  By 1993, no elementary-level student attended a school with 
an enrollment that was 90% or more African American.81  At the mid-
dle school and high school levels, the percentage of students attend-
ing schools with an African American enrollment of 90% or more de-
clined from about 45% to 22%.82
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled in fa-
vor of the state on every issue.  The Court ruled that the continued 
disparity in student test scores did not justify continuance of the fed-
eral court’s desegregation order.83  The Court concluded that the 
Constitution requires equal opportunity, not any particular result, and 
that therefore disparities between African American and white stu-
dents on standardized tests were not a sufficient basis for concluding 
that desegregation had not been achieved.84  The Supreme Court held 
that once a desegregation order is complied with in good faith, the 
federal court effort should end.85  Disparity in test scores is not a basis 
for continued federal court involvement.86
These Rehnquist Court decisions have led to a large number of 
lower court cases ending desegregation orders.87  The result has been 
the substantial resegregation of American public schools.   
Harvard Professor Gary Orfield has shown that, nationally, the 
percentage of African American students attending majority black 
schools and schools where over 90% of the students are black also has 
80 Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81 Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1165 (W.D. Mo. 1997). 
82 Id. 
83 Jenkins II, 515 U.S. at 101. 
84 Id. at 100-01. 
85 Id. at 89. 
86 Id. at 101. 
87 See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 335 (4th Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (ending the desegregation order for the Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
schools); NAACP v. Duval County Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 2001) (ending the 
desegregation order for the Tampa schools); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 195 F. Supp. 2d 971, 
999–1001 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (ending the desegregation efforts for the Benton Harbor 
public schools); Lee v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1368–69 
(M.D. Ala. 2002) (ending the desegregation order for the Butler County schools); Lee 
v. Opelika City Bd. of Educ., No. 70-T-853-E, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2513, at *28–29 
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2002) (ending the desegregation order for the Opelika schools); 
Davis v. Sch. Dist., 95 F. Supp. 2d 688, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (ending desegregation 
order for the Pontiac public schools). 
  
2006] ASSESSING CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST 1347 
 
increased in the last fifteen years.88  In 1986-1987, 63.3% of black stu-
dents attended schools that were comprised of 50% to 100% minority 
students; by 1998-1999, this composition had increased to 70.2%.89
In North Carolina, for example, the same pattern exists.  Between 
1993 and 2000, the number of black students attending schools with 
minority enrollments of 80% or more doubled.90  In Charlotte, fewer 
than 60% of the schools meet the standard definition of “diverse”; this 
is down from 85% in the 1980s.91 
A second way in which the Rehnquist Court has limited remedies 
for discrimination is by restricting affirmative action. The Rehnquist 
Court will be most remembered for its one decision upholding af-
firmative action:  Grutter v. Bollinger.92  Although this is an enormously 
important ruling, it must be remembered that this was the only 
Rehnquist Court decision upholding affirmative action.  When 
Rehnquist became Chief Justice, the level of scrutiny to be used for 
racial classifications benefiting minorities was uncertain.93  But the 
Rehnquist Court decisively adopted strict scrutiny review for affirma-
tive action programs, concluding that benign racial classifications 
benefiting minorities should be treated in the same way as invidious 
ones disadvantaging racial minorities.94  The Court repeatedly held 
that strict scrutiny review would be applied when the government used 
race as a factor in drawing election districts to benefit minorities.95
88 GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE:  CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RE-
SEGREGATION 32 (Harv. Univ. Civil Rights Project, 2001), available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Schools_More_Separate.pdf. 
89 Id. at 31. 
90 Tim Simmons & Susan Ebbs, Separate and Unequal, Again, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 18, 2001, at A1. 
91 Id. 
92 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan Law School’s 
race-conscious admissions program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
93 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980) (upholding affirma-
tive action program without adopting a level of scrutiny). 
94 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (adopting 
strict scrutiny for benign classifications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 506-07 (1989) (requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring for benign 
racial classifications). 
95 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (analyzing the creation 
of a majority black election district using strict scrutiny); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
653 (1993) (using strict scrutiny to analyze racial gerrymandering allegations).  The 
Court, however, did hold that race could be used if the reason was political, such as in 
allocating individuals likely to vote for Democrats.  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 
258 (2001). 
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Finally, it should be noted that the Rehnquist Court also consis-
tently interpreted civil rights statutes narrowly.  For example, in 1989, 
a series of Supreme Court decisions very narrowly interpreting federal 
civil rights statutes prompted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which over-
ruled these decisions by revising the federal civil rights laws.96  In 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court made it much more diffi-
cult for a plaintiff to recover in an employment discrimination case by 
requiring that the plaintiff prove a racially disparate impact.97  In Pat-
terson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that the federal prohibi-
tion of race discrimination in contracting, found in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
applies only to the formation of contracts, and that racial harassment 
after hiring is not actionable under that law.98
I doubt anyone would challenge that the Court’s approach to civil 
rights in the constitutional and statutory areas reflected the views of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.  He was in the majority in every one of the 
cases mentioned.  From the time he was nominated to the Supreme 
Court, there was concern over his views concerning civil rights, espe-
cially because of a memorandum he wrote as a law clerk to Justice 
Robert Jackson urging the affirmance of Plessy v. Ferguson.99  The 
Rehnquist Court succeeded in implementing the visions of its Chief in 
the area of equal protection and civil rights. 
B.  No New Fundamental Rights Were Recognized During the Rehnquist 
Court, and Many Already Existing Rights Were Narrowed 
With regard to individual rights, the Rehnquist Court always will 
be remembered most for not overruling Roe v. Wade.100 Rehnquist dis-
sented in Roe, along with Justice Byron White, and afterwards consis-
tently urged that the Court overrule Roe.101  The Rehnquist Court less-
ened constitutional protection for abortion rights by replacing strict 
96 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
97 490 U.S. 642, 648 (1989) (noting that employment claims are treated as dispa-
rate impact cases). 
98 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989) (noting that the relief available under § 1981 is limited 
to making and enforcing contracts and does not address problems after hiring); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (2000) (requiring that all persons have equal rights to “make 
and enforce contracts”). 
99 This memo is discussed in detail in KLUGER, supra note 6, at 609-15. 
100 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[The] right of privacy . . . is broad enough to en-
compass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
101 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“We be-
lieve that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled . . . .”). 
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scrutiny with the “undue burden” test to evaluate the constitutionality 
of government regulation of previability abortions.102  But this action 
obviously did not go nearly as far as Rehnquist would have liked, and 
Rehnquist consistently dissented in cases protecting abortion rights.103
Overall, though, Rehnquist’s views with regard to individual rights 
largely prevailed during his time as Chief Justice.  Most notably, not 
once did the Rehnquist Court recognize any new fundamental rights.  
The list of fundamental rights under the Constitution—claims of lib-
erties that trigger strict scrutiny—is exactly the same in 2006 as it was 
in 1986 when Rehnquist became Chief. 
There were only two instances in which the Rehnquist Court rec-
ognized new rights, and strikingly in each the Court did not use the 
language of fundamental rights or apply strict scrutiny.  In Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that competent 
adults have the right to refuse medical treatment, that a state may re-
quire clear and convincing evidence that a person wanted the treat-
ment to end, and that a state may prevent family members from ter-
minating treatment for another.104 Rehnquist wrote the opinion for 
the Court and though it assumed a right to refuse medical care, it 
clearly did not find a fundamental right or use strict scrutiny.  This 
was especially clear when, in Washington v. Glucksberg105 and Vacco v. 
Quill,106 the Supreme Court held that there is not a constitutional 
right to physician-assisted suicide.  Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opin-
ions in both of these cases. 
The other instance in which the Rehnquist Court recognized a 
new right was Lawrence v. Texas, which held that states may not crimi-
nally prohibit private, consensual same-sex sexual activity.107  Over 
Rehnquist’s dissenting vote, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick.108  
Although Lawrence is an enormously important decision protecting 
individual rights, it is significant that Justice Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion did not use the language of fundamental rights or strict scrutiny.  
102 Id. at 878 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.). 
103 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (invalidating, over 
Rehnquist’s dissent, a state law prohibiting certain abortion procedures). 
104 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990). 
105 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). 
106 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997). 
107 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
108 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not protect pri-
vate, consensual homosexual activity). 
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As a result, lower courts have read the case as endorsing only rational 
basis review.109
In many other areas, the Rehnquist Court significantly constricted 
individual rights compared to what they had been when Rehnquist 
became Chief in 1986.  Rehnquist was in the majority in all of these 
areas.  For example, in 1989, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme 
Court significantly limited the rights of unmarried fathers.110  The Su-
preme Court held that even an unmarried father who participates ac-
tively in the child’s life is not entitled to due process if the mother is 
married to someone else.111  Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled 
that a state may create an irrebuttable presumption that a married 
woman’s husband is the father of her child even though it negates all 
of the biological father’s rights.112  Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion. 
Another particularly important example of the narrowing of con-
stitutional protections was Employment Division v. Smith, which greatly 
limited the protections of the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.113  Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia’s major-
ity opinion holding that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a 
neutral law of general applicability, no matter how much the law bur-
dens religion.114  Never before had the Court articulated this restric-
tive view of the Constitution’s protections for free exercise of religion. 
Thus, the overall record of the Rehnquist Court in following the 
views of the Chief Justice was more mixed with regard to fundamental 
rights than with regard to equal protection.  No new fundamental 
rights were recognized and some existing rights were narrowed, but 
the Court did not go as far in this direction as Rehnquist urged. 
109 See, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]e decline to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to sexual privacy trig-
gering strict scrutiny.”). 
110 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (“[T]he absence of a legal tie with the mother may in 
such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional 
claims may otherwise exist.” (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting))). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 129-30. 
113 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). 
114 Id. at 882. 
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C.  The Protections Accorded Criminal Defendants  
Were Significantly Narrowed 
Another consistent feature of the Rehnquist Court has been its 
strong likelihood of ruling in favor of the government in criminal 
procedure cases.  Generally, criminal defendants have lost before the 
Rehnquist Court in all three of its phases.  Rehnquist has been in the 
majority in all of these efforts. 
For example, the Court constantly has sought to narrow the avail-
ability of habeas corpus for prisoners.  In 1989, in Teague v. Lane, the 
Court imposed a significant new limit on the availability of relief un-
der habeas corpus:  habeas petitions could be heard only if they relied 
on already existing constitutional principles, and “new rules” could be 
raised on habeas corpus only in the rare circumstances that they 
would apply retroactively.115  In McCleskey v. Zant, the Court ruled that 
successive habeas petitions were not allowed unless the petitioner 
could demonstrate either cause and prejudice or actual innocence.116
In 1996, Congress greatly restricted the availability of habeas cor-
pus in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.117  
Since then, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute expansively 
to limit habeas corpus.  For example, in Tyler v. Cain, the Court held 
that a habeas petition cannot be heard, even if a person was clearly 
unconstitutionally convicted, unless the Supreme Court holds that its 
prior decision applies retroactively.118
The Fourth Amendment is another area in which criminal defen-
dants have lost throughout the Rehnquist Court.  In 1989, for in-
stance, the Court upheld drug-courier profiling119 and ground 
searches by airplanes flying within permissible limits.120  In the early 
1990s, the Court upheld the constitutionality of arresting a person for 
a traffic violation that carries no possibility of a prison sentence,121 
115 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989). 
116 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991). 
117 Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (amending certain ha-
beas corpus procedures). 
118 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001). 
119 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (noting that the evidentiary 
value of factors leading to a conclusion of reasonable suspicion is not lessened by their 
inclusion in a “drug courier profile”). 
120 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding that, since the police 
helicopter was legally flying in public airspace when the defendant’s property was ob-
served, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated). 
121 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (addressing the con-
stitutionality of arrests for minor crimes). 
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stops of motorists based on only innocuous factors,122 and searches of 
bus passengers without meaningful consent.123  These, of course, are 
only a few examples of Fourth Amendment rulings.  In the last three 
years of the Rehnquist Court, there were fourteen Fourth Amend-
ment cases, and the police won in thirteen of them.124
But especially in the last few years of the Rehnquist Court, there 
were some notable triumphs by criminal defendants.  In Dickerson v. 
United States,125 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona.126
Perhaps most dramatically, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court pro-
tected the right to trial by jury by holding that any factor, other than a 
prior conviction, that leads to a sentence greater than the statutory 
maximum must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.127  
Apprendi has brought about an enormous amount of litigation and 
unquestionably is one of the most important developments during the 
Rehnquist years.  Rehnquist was in the dissent in Apprendi and Blakely 
v. Washington,128 though in the majority in United States v. Booker’s129 
conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional 
so long as they are advisory and not mandatory. 
122 See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (upholding a traffic stop 
based on the border patrol agent’s “observations, his registration check, and his ex-
perience”). 
123 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203-04 (2002) (declining to hold the 
search in question an illegal seizure). 
124 The Fourth Amendment cases from Rehnquist’s last Term all were won by law 
enforcement.  See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005) (holding that the offi-
cer’s detainment of the defendant was reasonable in spite of the lack of independent 
reasonable suspicion about the defendant’s immigration status); Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (characterizing the police conduct in question as not infring-
ing the defendant’s Fourth Amendment Rights); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 
153-54 (2004) (upholding an arrest as supported by probable cause, even though the 
offense was not closely related to the reasons stated for the arrest).  The only exception 
in the last two years was Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004) (requiring that the 
warrant must specify with particularity that which is to be searched or seized). 
125 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
126 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
127 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). 
 128 542 U.S. 297, 301 (2004) (applying the Apprendi rule that any factor, other than 
a prior conviction, that provides for a penalty greater than that which could be im-
posed based on the jury’s verdict or what the defendant admitted, must be proven to 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 129 543 U.S. 220, 233-34, 260-63 (2005) (applying the principles of Apprendi and 
Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, requiring the guidelines to be advisory, 
not mandatory, and holding that appellate review should be to determine whether a 
sentence is unreasonable). 
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There were other notable victories for criminal defendants, par-
ticularly during the third phase of the Rehnquist Court.  In Crawford v. 
Washington, the Court changed the law, overruled precedent, and pro-
vided more protections under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment by limiting hearsay testimony that could be used against 
criminal defendants.130  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court in-
validated the death penalty for the mentally retarded.131  In a six-to-
three decision, with Justice Stevens writing for the Court and 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissenting, the Court reaffirmed that 
“evolving standards of decency” are to be used to determine what is 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.132  The 
Court looked to the trend among the states as well as international 
practice in determining “evolving standards of decency.”133  The Court 
pointed to the number of states that have eliminated the death pen-
alty for crimes committed by the mentally retarded and how few for-
eign countries permit the practice.134  Quite importantly, the Court 
stressed that there is a significant risk of executing innocent individu-
als because those with mental disabilities are more likely to make false 
confessions and are less likely to be able to work with counsel.135
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court ruled that it was cruel and unusual 
punishment to impose the death penalty for crimes committed by ju-
veniles.136  In the five-to-four decision, Justice Kennedy wrote the opin-
ion for the Court, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.137  Once more, the Court rested its decision on the 
premise that “evolving standards of decency” are to be used to deter-
mine what is cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court explained:  
“To implement this framework we have established the propriety and 
affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine 
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and un-
130 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and 
holding that using out-of-court, testimonial statements without providing the criminal 
defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness violates the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
131 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
132 Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
133 Id. at 314-17. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 320-21. 
136 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
137 Id. at 554. 
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usual.”138  As in Atkins, the Court again looked to the trend among the 
states and international practice in determining “evolving standards of 
decency.”139
Overall though, surely no one would disagree that the Rehnquist 
Court, throughout its existence, overwhelmingly has sided with the 
government and ruled against criminal defendants in criminal proce-
dure cases.  This is an area where the Supreme Court was generally 
quite in accord with the views of its Chief Justice. 
D.  The Limits Imposed on the Government by the  
Establishment Clause Were Relaxed 
In important ways, this is an area where Chief Justice Rehnquist 
did not succeed; the Rehnquist Court did not go nearly as far as 
Rehnquist would have liked in changing the law regarding the Estab-
lishment Clause.  Although Rehnquist clearly favored overruling the 
test for the Establishment Clause articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman,140 there never were five votes in favor of this view.141  
Rehnquist’s position—that the Establishment Clause is violated only if 
the government establishes a church, coerces religious participation, 
or favors some religions over others142—never was adopted by a major-
ity of the Court.  To be more specific, Rehnquist consistently dis-
sented in cases limiting prayers in public schools.143
But the Rehnquist Court did follow Rehnquist’s views of the Estab-
lishment Clause in one key area:  the Court allowed significantly more 
138 Id. at 560-61 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). 
139 Id. at 563-65, 575-78. 
140 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (explaining that the government violates the Estab-
lishment Clause if it acts with the purpose of advancing religion, or if the primary ef-
fect of its act is to advance or inhibit religion, or if there is excessive government en-
tanglement with religion). 
141 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (describing the view of four Justices, including Rehnquist, that the ma-
jority’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause is incorrect); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (demonstrating that four Justices, includ-
ing Rehnquist, urged changes in the law of the Establishment Clause). 
142 For an articulation of this view set out in a concurring opinion that Rehnquist 
joined, see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656-58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
143 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-16 (2000) (decid-
ing that student-delivered prayers at high school football games violate the Establish-
ment Clause); Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (holding that prayers delivered by members of the 
clergy at public school graduations over student objection violate the Establishment 
Clause). 
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government aid to religious schools.  In 1997, in Agostini v. Felton, the 
Court reversed a decade-old precedent and held that public school 
special education teachers may provide services in parochial 
schools.144
In Mitchell v. Helms, decided in June 2000, the Court reversed two 
precedents and allowed the government to lend instructional equip-
ment to parochial schools.145  Two years later, in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, the Court upheld a voucher program for the Cleveland schools 
even though 96% of the vouchers went to parochial schools.146  In an 
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court, five to four, concluded 
that this did not violate the Establishment Clause because all schools, 
including all religious schools, could receive money and because the 
government was acting with the permissible purpose of improving 
education for children.147
Thus, with respect to the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist’s suc-
cess was more mixed.  This, however, may be an area where 
Rehnquist’s vision ultimately will triumph.  If the two new Justices—
John Roberts and Samuel Alito—take the Rehnquist approach, there 
will be five votes to overrule the Lemon test and bring about the dra-
matic change long sought by Rehnquist. 
E.  Access to Federal Courts to Hear Civil Rights Claims  
Was Significantly Limited 
One of the most overlooked consequences of the Rehnquist 
Court’s jurisprudence has been a significant restriction of access to 
the courthouse.  In a series of cases interpreting federal civil rights 
statutes, the Court consistently has limited the ability of civil rights 
plaintiffs to sue.  In every one of these cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was in the majority and almost all were decided five to four. 
For example, in Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court held, five to four, 
that there is no private right of action to enforce regulations promul-
gated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.148  Title VI pre-
vents recipients of federal money from discriminating based on race 
144 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 
(1985)). 
145 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (overruling, to the extent they conflict with the 
Mitchell holding, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229 (1977)). 
146 536 U.S. 639, 644, 647 (2002). 
147 Id. at 649, 653. 
148 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
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and from engaging in practices that have a racially discriminatory im-
pact.149  The importance of these regulations cannot be overstated.  
The Supreme Court has held that violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause and equal protection components of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment require proof of discriminatory purpose, which 
may be difficult to show.150  Therefore, Title VI regulations are the key 
method of challenging actions that disadvantage racial minorities 
when discriminatory purpose cannot be proven.  Since it is so difficult 
to prove discriminatory intent, Title VI has been an enormously im-
portant weapon in civil rights litigation.151  But the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Alexander that no lawsuits can be brought under these regu-
lations means that civil rights plaintiffs have lost a key weapon for 
challenging practices that have a racially discriminatory impact. 
Notably, the Court, in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, did not in-
validate the Title VI regulations.  The Court did say, however, that 
their validity was an open question to be considered on another occa-
sion.152  Instead, the Court assumed the validity of the regulations and 
ruled that no lawsuits can be brought to enforce them.  How, then, 
are the Title VI regulations to be enforced?  They only can be en-
forced if the political branches of government are willing to cut off 
funds to recipients who engage in practices with a racially disparate 
impact.  Once more, the Court has denied access to the judiciary and 
left enforcement of civil rights to the political branches of govern-
ment. 
Another example of the Court’s restriction of access to the judici-
ary is the imposition of limits on the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to en-
force other federal civil rights laws.  Some federal civil rights laws, like 
other federal statutes, do not authorize a private right of action.  Sec-
tion 1983 is the crucial vehicle for enforcement of these laws in 
courts.153  But in Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court held that the pro-
visions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act that restrict 
educational institutions from releasing information about their stu-
dents cannot be enforced through a private right of action as a § 1983 
149 See id. at 279-81 (describing aspects of Title VI that “must be taken as given”). 
150 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that dispropor-
tionate impact alone is not enough to invalidate a statute). 
151 See, e.g., S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 
774 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering a disparate impact claim under Title VI in an envi-
ronmental racism case). 
152 Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279. 
 153 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing for the liability of anyone who, under 
color of law, deprives another of her constitutional rights). 
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suit.154  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion held that since the 
law was adopted by Congress under its spending power and did not 
unambiguously confer individual rights, it could not be enforced 
through litigation.155  As in Alexander, compliance will depend on the 
willingness of the political branches to enforce the law’s requirements 
by cutting off funds to offending institutions.  The unquestionable 
value of litigation in deterring violations and providing a remedy to 
victims was never recognized by the Court. 
Yet another example of the closing of the courthouse doors has 
been the aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses.  There has 
been an important trend in recent years towards businesses insisting 
on arbitration clauses in contracts.  This is common in many areas, 
such as employment and health care.  Frequently, these clauses are 
written in broad terms and leave the other party to the contract no al-
ternative but to forego access to the courts. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams involved an employee of a Circuit 
City store in California who sued the company in state court under 
state antidiscrimination laws.156  His employment application included 
a clause providing for arbitration of employment-related disputes.157  
Circuit City filed a lawsuit in federal district court, pursuant to the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) of 1925,158 to compel arbitration.159  
The FAA has an exception for maritime and other employment con-
tracts in interstate commerce.160  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in 
a five-to-four decision, ruled that the state law discrimination claims 
had to go to arbitration and could not be litigated in court.161  The 
Court broadly construed the FAA and narrowly interpreted its excep-
tion to apply only to “employment of transportation workers.”162  The 
Court did not discuss, or even acknowledge, the compelling public 
purpose of allowing victims of discrimination to have access to the 
courts.163
154 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002). 
155 Id. at 279. 
156 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001). 
157 Id. at 109-10. 
158 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000). 
159 532 U.S. at 110. 
160 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
161 532 U.S. at 124. 
162 Id. at 119. 
163 It should be noted, though, that in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. 
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002), the Court held that an arbitration clause 
does not preclude the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from 
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The above techniques of closing the courthouse door have in-
volved the Supreme Court directly precluding all access by civil rights 
plaintiffs.  The Court also ruled against civil rights plaintiffs by elimi-
nating incentives to litigate and creating obstacles which are disincen-
tives to suits. 
The Supreme Court’s important ruling in Buckhannon Board & 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 
provides an example of the former approach, where the Court made 
it much more difficult for successful plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ 
fees.164  The availability of attorneys’ fees under civil rights statutes is a 
major incentive for suits.  The reality is that without this incentive, it 
would be far more difficult to enforce civil rights laws.  Buckhannon in-
volved a challenge to state regulations under several federal statutes, 
including the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990.165  There was protracted litigation 
and ultimately the state voluntarily changed its policy and adopted 
what the plaintiffs had been seeking through their suit.166  The plain-
tiffs then sought attorneys’ fees on the grounds that they had been the 
catalyst for the changes.  The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, rejected their position and held that a plaintiff is not deemed to 
“prevail” just because her lawsuit is the “catalyst” for the government 
to change its policy.167  Attorneys’ fees are to be awarded only when 
there is a judicial action—a judgment or consent decree—in favor of 
the plaintiff.168
The result is that a defendant can preclude a deserving plaintiff 
from recovering attorneys’ fees simply by changing policies before a 
verdict.  Reducing the chances of attorneys’ fees in this way will often 
remove a crucial incentive to litigate and effectively close the court-
house door in many civil rights cases. 
bringing a discrimination claim on behalf of an individual.  The Court explained that 
an individual, via an arbitration clause, waives her right to sue, but the person cannot 
waive the government’s authority to bring an enforcement action.  Id. at 286-88.  This 
is a significant ruling, but it does relatively little to undercut the effect of Circuit City.  
The EEOC’s ability to sue on behalf of individuals is inherently limited by scarce re-
sources.  The vast majority of employees with arbitration clauses in their contracts will 
not have any meaningful access to the courts when they are subjected to discrimina-
tion. 
164 532 U.S. 598, 605-06 (2001). 
165 Id. at 601. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 605-06. 
168 Id. at 603. 
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Cumulatively, these decisions make it much harder for civil rights 
plaintiffs to be heard in federal court or to gain relief.  Since 
Rehnquist was in the majority of all of these cases and wrote several of 
the opinions, there is no doubt that the Court was in accord with his 
substantive vision. 
F.  The Powers of Congress Were Restricted for the First Time in Almost Sixty Years:  
New Limits Were Imposed on Congress’s Commerce Power and  
Its Authority Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,  
the Tenth Amendment Was Revived as a Constraint on Federal Power,  
and There Was a Significant Expansion of State Sovereign Immunity 
I have no doubt that when constitutional historians look back at 
the Rehnquist Court, they will say that its greatest changes in constitu-
tional law were in the area of federalism.  Especially here, there is no 
doubt that Rehnquist had a definite substantive vision, and the 
Rehnquist Court, except in the last few years, acted in accordance with 
his views. 
In the first third of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court used 
concern over states’ rights and federalism as the basis for limiting the 
scope of Congress’s commerce power and also held that the Tenth 
Amendment reserves a zone of activities for exclusive state control.  
For example, in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Court struck down a federal 
law prohibiting child labor on the ground that it violated the Tenth 
Amendment.169  After 1937, however, the Court rejected this view and 
no longer saw the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power; it 
was just a reminder that Congress could not act unless there was ex-
press or implied constitutional authority.170
In 1976, the Court appeared to revive federalism as a limit on 
congressional powers in National League of Cities v. Usery, in which the 
Court invalidated a federal law that required state and local govern-
ments to pay their employees a minimum wage.171  The Court, in an 
opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress could not regu-
late states in areas of “traditional” or “integral” state responsibility.172  
This was a dramatic decision, as it was the first instance of the Su-
preme Court striking a law down on federalism grounds in forty years. 
169  241 U.S. 251, 274, 276-77 (1918) (“The grant of authority over a purely federal 
matter was not intended to destroy the local power always reserved to the states in the 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
170 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310-11 (2d ed. 2002). 
171 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
172 Id. at 851-52. 
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Rehnquist’s strong support for states’ rights, especially as a limit 
on federal power, was noted before he became Chief Justice.173  Only 
after he became Chief Justice, however, was Rehnquist’s vision real-
ized.  Nine years after National League of Cities was decided, it was ex-
pressly overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity.174  Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, said that he believed that 
his view would again triumph on the Court.175
Subsequently, after he became Chief Justice, the Court endorsed 
Rehnquist’s views and revived the Tenth Amendment as a constraint 
on Congress’s authority.  In New York v. United States, the Court—for 
only the second time in fifty-five years and the first time since the 
overruled National League of Cities decision—invalidated a federal law 
as violating the Tenth Amendment.176  A federal law, the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, created a statutory 
duty for states to provide for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes 
generated within their borders.177  In an opinion by Justice O’Connor, 
the Court held that forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive 
wastes would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments.178  The 
Court concluded that it was “clear” that because of the Tenth 
Amendment, “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States 
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”179
A few years later, in Printz v. United States, the Court applied and 
extended New York v. United States.180  Printz involved a challenge to the 
federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993.181  The law 
required that the “chief law enforcement officer” of each local juris-
diction conduct background checks before issuing permits for fire-
173 For an excellent description of Rehnquist’s federalism vision, written before 
Rehnquist became Chief, see Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian:  Justice Rehnquist and 
Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1363-70 (1982). 
174 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985). 
175 Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
176 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
177 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988) (requiring states to either “provide for the 
disposal of all [radioactive] waste” created within their borders or take title to and ac-
cept possession of the waste). 
178 505 U.S. at 188. 
179 Id. 
180 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
181 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994). 
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arms.182  The Court, in a five-to-four decision, found that the law vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment.183
The Rehnquist Court revived federalism as a limit on Congress’s 
powers in another way:  It restricted the scope of Congress’s com-
merce power.  In United States v. Lopez,184 the Supreme Court, with the 
majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, declared uncon-
stitutional the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, a federal 
law that made it a crime to have a firearm within one thousand feet of 
a school.185
In United States v. Morrison,186 the Court followed Lopez and de-
clared unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994.187  The provision created a federal cause 
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence.  In enacting the 
Violence Against Women Act, Congress held lengthy hearings and 
found that gender-motivated violence cost the American economy bil-
lions of dollars a year.188  Most importantly, Congress found that state 
courts often insufficiently dealt with violence against women.189  But 
the Supreme Court nonetheless invalidated the law in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.190
Rehnquist also was instrumental in advancing states’ rights 
through the expansion of the scope of state sovereign immunity.  In 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, a 1996 opinion written by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress may authorize suits against 
states only pursuant to laws enacted under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to adopt statutes to 
enforce that Amendment.191  Based on this finding, in Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court, 
again in opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that state govern-
ments cannot be sued for patent infringement.192  In Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents, the Court decided that state governments may not be 
sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
182 Id. § 922(s)(2). 
183 521 U.S. at 933. 
184 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). 
185 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). 
186 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
187 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994). 
188 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
189 Id. at 619-20 (majority opinion). 
190 Id. at 627. 
191 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). 
192 527 U.S. 627, 647-68 (1999). 
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1967.193  In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that state governments may not be sued 
for employment discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990.194  In each case, the Court, in a five-to-
four decision, concluded that Congress was expanding the scope of 
rights and that the laws could not be justified as narrowly tailored to 
preventing or remedying constitutional violations.195
The Court also expanded the situations in which sovereign im-
munity could be asserted.  In another five-to-four decision, Alden v. 
Maine, the Court held that sovereign immunity protects state govern-
ments from being sued in state court without their consent, even to 
enforce federal laws.196  At oral argument in Alden, Solicitor General 
Seth Waxman quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Ar-
ticle VI and contended that suits against states are essential to assure 
the supremacy of federal law.197  Justice Kennedy’s response to this ar-
gument in the Alden opinion is enormously revealing of the Rehnquist 
Court’s attitude towards federalism.  He stated: 
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in 
its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to dis-
regard the Constitution or valid federal law.  The States and their offi-
cers are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by fed-
eral statutes that comport with the constitutional design.  We are 
unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or 
obey the binding laws of the United States.  The good faith of the States 
thus provides an important assurance that “[t]his Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”
198
What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply 
with federal law?  Trust in the good faith of state governments?  Is it 
possible to imagine that thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the 
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court would have issued such a 
statement that state governments simply could be trusted to voluntar-
ily comply with federal law? 
193 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). 
194 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
195 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646; 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. 
196 527 U.S. 706, 759-60 (1999). 
197 Transcript of Oral Argument, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (No. 98-
436), 1999 WL 216178 at *12. 
198 527 U.S. at 754-55 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI). 
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Interestingly, the most recent federalism decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court were in favor of federal power.  In Nevada Department 
of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court allowed suits against states for 
violations of the family leave provisions of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993.199  Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in 
the six-to-three decision.  In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court held that 
states may be sued pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 for discriminating against people with disabilities with 
regard to access to the courts.200  Here, Rehnquist dissented in a five-
to-four decision.  Finally, in his last Term, in Gonzales v. Raich, the 
Court, over Rehnquist’s dissent, upheld the constitutionality of a fed-
eral law prohibiting cultivation and possession of small amounts of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes.201  Rehnquist wrote the opinion in 
Hibbs, but dissented in Lane and Raich. 
Overall, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions are a dramatic 
departure in the law from what it was before William Rehnquist be-
came Chief Justice.  In every case limiting federal power, Rehnquist 
was in the majority, and in many he wrote the Court’s decision.  The 
only deviation was in the third phase of the Rehnquist Court de-
scribed above.  But there can be little dispute that federalism was one 
of Rehnquist’s great triumphs in bringing his conservative vision to 
constitutional doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many ways in which a Chief Justice can influence the 
substantive decision making of the Court.  The Chief plays a key role 
in leading the conferences that determine which cases will be heard.  
The Chief leads the discussions at conferences where the cases are de-
cided.  The Chief assigns the majority opinion when in the majority, 
and this often can be important in keeping the majority.  In all of 
these ways, and others, a Chief can have a significant effect on the de-
cisions.  All of these forms of influence are invisible outside the Court, 
except by looking at the results and the decisions themselves. 
Yet, it is possible to assess the success of a Chief Justice by looking 
at whether that individual’s views were followed by the Court.  My 
conclusion is that William Rehnquist was a tremendously successful 
Chief Justice, especially in his first sixteen years as Chief, in having his 
199 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003). 
200 541 U.S. 509, 533-54 (2004). 
201 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005). 
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views accepted by a majority and reflected in the decisions of his 
Court. 
